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TOWARD A FRAMEWORK STATUTE FOR SUPRANATIONAL 
ADJUDICATION 
Ernest A. Young* 
The early decades of the twenty-first century may turn out to be the time 
when supranational adjudication comes of age.  Jenny Martinez recently 
observed that “there are now more than fifty international courts, tribunals, and 
quasi-judicial bodies, most of which have been established in the past twenty 
years.”1  Curtis Bradley notes that “[i]ncreasingly, in terms of the subject 
matters that they address and the ways in which they are structured, 
international adjudicatory institutions are resembling traditional domestic 
courts rather than simply interstate arbitral mechanisms.”2  And private 
litigants are asking domestic courts to enforce the judgments of international 
bodies with increasing frequency.3 
The upshot is that while courses in International Law used to be a lot like 
Constitutional Law, they will increasingly turn into Federal Courts.  
Constitutional Law, after all, has most often been concerned with questions of 
substantive right—Does the Due Process Clause protect abortion?  Does the 
Dormant Commerce Clause prohibit certain forms of state regulation of 
business?—and International Law has frequently focused on similar questions 
under both human rights and trade agreements.  But with the advent of 
supranational institutions that legislate, prosecute, and adjudicate, and the 
concomitant need to manage the relationship between those institutions and 
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 Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an International Judicial System, 56 STAN. L. REV. 429, 430 (2003); see 
also Christopher J. Borgen, Transnational Tribunals and the Transmission of Norms: The Hegemony of 
Process, 38 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (“This is a golden age for international dispute 
resolution.  There are more courts covering more topics with more cases than ever before.”).  For a useful 
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INTERNATIONAL JUDICIARY IN CONTEXT: A SYNOPTIC CHART (2004), http://www.pict-pcti.org/publications/ 
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59, 97 [hereinafter Bradley, Judicial Power]; accord Mark L. Movsesian, Judging International Judgments, 48 
VA. J. INT’L L. 65, 66 (2007). 
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 See generally Julian G. Ku, International Delegations and the New World Court Order, 81 WASH. L. 
REV. 1 (2006) (discussing a rising tide of attempts to domestically enforce international tribunals’ judgments). 
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parallel institutions at the national level, International Law seems likely to 
become increasingly preoccupied with managing jurisdictional conflicts and 
developing rules for remedies and choice of law—the bread and butter of the 
domestic course in Federal Courts.4 
International institutions with authority to legislate, prosecute, and 
adjudicate of their own volition necessarily raise questions about due process, 
judicial independence, and the delegation of authority ordinarily exercised by 
domestic governments.  How those questions are answered will, in turn, affect 
more basic constitutional values of federalism, separation of powers, 
democratic accountability, and procedural fairness.  One way to approach these 
questions is to measure the new supranational arrangements against domestic 
constitutional norms that guarantee fair procedure, separation of powers, and 
democratic accountability.  In the United States, those norms include a general, 
if not-very-lively, principle of non delegation as well as several more specific 
principles, such as the textual strictures of the Due Process and Appointments 
Clauses and doctrinal limits on the allocation of federal judicial authority to 
non-Article III courts.  Much good work has been done along these lines.5  But 
these domestic constitutional provisions and principles were originally framed 
to address quite different problems, and they have evolved over time in ways 
that reflect largely domestic concerns.  The awkwardness of bringing them to 
bear on contemporary supranational judicial institutions is reflected in Henry 
Monaghan’s recent way of framing the question: “Does the ‘ancient 
Constitution’ of 1789, particularly its Third Article, and of 1791, particularly 
its Due Process Clause, impose any real limits upon the new, wholly 
unanticipated, supranational adjudicatory developments?”6  It is unsurprising 
that, having framed the question in this way, Professor Monaghan concludes 
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Execution, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1557 (2003); Julian G. Ku, The Delegation of Federal Power to International 
Organizations: New Problems with Old Solutions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 71 (2000); Edward T. Swaine, The 
Constitutionality of International Delegations, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1492 (2004); John C. Yoo, The New 
Sovereignty and the Old Constitution: The Chemical Weapons Convention and the Appointments Clause, 15 
CONST. COMMENT. 87 (1998). 
 
6
 Henry Paul Monaghan, Article III and Supranational Judicial Review, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 833, 842 
(2007). 
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that “any difficulties created by the Constitution for the emerging adjudicatory 
order will prove to be rather small beer.”7 
I want to try a different approach in this Essay.  While remaining agnostic 
about whether any given supranational regime violates the specific 
constitutional principles discussed in the existing literature, I agree that those 
principles map rather awkwardly onto the real concerns we have (or ought to 
have) about supranational institutions.  In this sense, I think David Golove is 
right when he suggests that “[t]he considerations that are relevant to structuring 
the forms of domestic democratic government can provide at best only a 
starting point in thinking about how to structure . . . relationships . . . with 
other sovereign nations for the purpose of carrying out cooperative projects 
serving mutual interests and addressing common concerns.”8  What I propose 
here is a set of statutory principles to regulate the delegation of authority to 
supranational adjudicatory institutions.  Because they are formulated as a 
legislative proposal, these principles need not be teased out of constitutional 
provisions and doctrines formulated long ago for entirely different purposes.  
Our entrenched Constitution has long left considerable room for institutional 
innovation with respect to both foreign relations and, on the domestic side, 
managing the relations between two parallel systems of courts.  We ought to 
use that flexibility to talk directly about how the interface between domestic 
and supranational courts ought to be structured. 
I hasten to add, of course, that my particular proposals are tendered in the 
most tentative possible way.  Hopefully, they will at least serve as a starting 
point for fruitful discussion of how we might integrate supranational 
adjudication into our existing judicial system. 
I. THE CASE FOR A FRAMEWORK STATUTE 
Scholars of constitutional law are often criticized for focusing too much on 
courts, to the exclusion of other institutional actors—legislators, executive 
actors, even “the People Themselves.”9  One consequence of this judicial focus 
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8
 David Golove, The New Confederalism: Treaty Delegations of Legislative, Executive, and Judicial 
Authority, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1697, 1701 (2003).  As will be clear, however, I do think that domestic 
constitutional experience will often be relevant in determining how to structure supranational adjudicatory 
institutions. 
 
9
 See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 7–8 (2004) (emphasizing the role of the People); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL 
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is to take the non-constitutional law—the object of constitutional review—
essentially as given; constitutional analysis tends to enter at the stage of the 
judiciary’s “sober second thought,” when legislative or executive policy has 
already been formulated.10  Notwithstanding the oft-heard critique that our 
Constitution is too difficult to amend so as to take account of new 
developments,11 constitutional scholarship is forever inventing new doctrines 
or adapting old ones to deal with the problems of the day.  We take the law on 
which those constitutional doctrines will operate—for present purposes, our 
existing supranational organizations and the implementing legislation that 
governs how those organizations operate on the domestic legal system—as 
relatively fixed. 
This judicial review orientation likely has a number of causes.  Most 
constitutional scholars are lawyers by training, and we tend to see 
constitutional issues as courts see them.  We are also likely to perceive the 
courts as “forums of principle”12 that may be influenced simply by making a 
good argument, whereas legislative or executive action often depends on the 
mobilization of political forces to which scholars rarely have access.  It may 
not actually be easier to convince a court to strike down the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on delegation grounds than it would be get 
Congress to amend the treaty’s implementing legislation, but the processes by 
which one would go about pursuing the former course are certainly more 
familiar to most constitutional scholars than those involved in pursuing the 
latter. 
The more basic cause, however, may have to do with a sense of the division 
of labor between constitutional and non-constitutional law.  In the conventional 
view, constitutional law sets the boundary on a range of permissible legislative 
choices, but it has virtually nothing to say about how choices within this 
bounded area ought to be made.13  For example, the delegation doctrine—if it 
 
CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999) (discussing the construction of 
constitutional meaning in the political branches). 
 
10
 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF 
POLITICS 25–26 (1962); cf. William B. Fisch & Richard S. Kay, The Constitutionalization of Law in the United 
States, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 437, 458–61 (1998 Supp.) (arguing, conversely, that constitutionalizing legal 
questions tends to judicialize them as well). 
 
11
 See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GOES 
WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) 159–66 (2006). 
 
12
 See Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469 (1981). 
 
13
 See GERALD LEONARD, THE INVENTION OF PARTY POLITICS: FEDERALISM, POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY, 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN JACKSONIAN ILLINOIS 15 (2002) (observing that modern 
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even exists anymore, and if it applies to supranational delegations—requires 
that U.S. treaty-makers provide an intelligible principle for supranational 
delegatees to follow;14 Article III and the Appointments Clause may also place 
certain aspects of federal judicial and executive power off limits to 
delegation.15  But as the metaphor of a boundary or frame suggests, these 
constraints nibble round the edges of the more basic problems: Precisely how 
much authority should supranational institutions exercise?  And how should 
they be structured?  Given the capacious nature of the limits imposed by the 
delegation doctrine and the textual limits just mentioned, constitutional 
lawyers may have to shrug their shoulders when we come to these more basic 
questions. 
I suggest that we broaden our conception of “constitutional” law.16  The 
primary function of a constitution is to “constitute” the government—to 
establish institutions, confer powers upon them, set the boundaries of their 
jurisdiction, and define rights that individuals may possess against government 
action.17  In some legal systems, such as the British, whatever laws perform 
these functions are considered part of “the Constitution.”18  And although the 
American system limits that appellation to a particular document that is 
 
constitutional lawyers tend “to see politics as working within a constitutional order rather than working out that 
constitutional order”). 
 
14
 See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (quoting J.W. Hampton, 
Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)).  As the Court noted in American Trucking, “[i]n the 
history of the Court we have found the requisite ‘intelligible principle’ lacking in only two statutes,” id. at 474, 
and “we have ‘almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy 
judgment that can be left to those executing or applying the law,’” id. at 474–75 (quoting Mistretta v. United 
States, 488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).  As Curtis Bradley has recently noted, there are good 
reasons to think that the delegation doctrine might have more purchase when applied to delegations of judicial 
authority and when those delegations are to actors outside the domestic governmental process.  See Bradley, 
Judicial Power, supra note 2, at 87–89.  But even a more rigorous delegation principle would most likely leave 
a considerable range of institutional arrangements open to U.S. treaty-makers, and it is worth focusing on the 
constitutive questions existing within that range of constitutionally-permissible options. 
 
15
 See, e.g., N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (holding that the 
1978 Bankruptcy Act violated Article III by delegating judicial duties to non-Article III bankruptcy judges); 
Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 464 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (construing treaty to avoid constitutional 
questions that would arise if the treaty-makers had delegated binding rulemaking authority to a supranational 
body). 
 
16
 See generally Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408 (2007) 
[hereinafter Young, Outside the Constitution]. 
 
17
 See ADAM TOMKINS, PUBLIC LAW 3–6 (2003); Joseph Raz, On the Authority and Interpretation of 
Constitutions: Some Preliminaries, in CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 152, 153–54 
(Larry Alexander ed.,1998) (identifying seven features that define constitutions). 
 
18
 See TOMKINS, supra note 17, at 7–14; see also Matthew S.R. Palmer, Using Constitutional Realism to 
Identify the Complete Constitution: Lessons from an Unwritten Constitution, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 587 (2006) 
(discussing the constitution of New Zealand). 
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uniquely entrenched against change, it remains the case that most of the legal 
rules that constitute our government—that is, the legal rules that establish and 
limit our governmental institutions—exist outside the canonical text.19  The 
organic statutes establishing the various federal administrative agencies, the 
Judiciary Acts that establish and delimit our judicial system, and the House and 
Senate rules for vetting and voting upon legislation—all of these are examples 
of our “constitution outside the Constitution.”20 
This phenomenon is nowhere more salient than in the law governing the 
foreign relations of the United States.  The canonical Constitution has 
relatively little to say about the conduct of foreign affairs.21  The dominant 
separation of powers principle in the area, articulated by Justice Jackson in the 
Steel Seizure Case,22 makes executive power largely a function of 
congressional action.  According to Justice Jackson’s scheme, the President’s 
power is at its maximum when he acts with authorization from Congress, and 
at its minimum when he contravenes a legislative command.23  For this reason, 
as Harold Koh has observed, foreign affairs powers are allocated through 
“framework statutes” such as “the Judiciary Act of 1789, the National Security 
Act of 1947, the War Powers Resolution of 1973, the Congressional Budget 
and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, the National Emergencies Act of 1976, 
and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977.”24  Dean Koh 
defines such statutes as “laws that Congress enacts and the president signs 
within their zone of concurrent authority, not simply to ‘formulate policies and 
procedures for the resolution of specific problems, but rather . . . to implement 
 
 
19
 See generally Karl Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1934). 
 
20
 See generally Young, Outside the Constitution, supra note 16. 
 
21
 See HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE 
IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 67 (1990) (“One cannot read the Constitution without being struck by its astonishing 
brevity regarding the allocation of foreign affairs authority among the branches.”). 
 
22
 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 635–37 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring); see also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668–69 (1981) (adopting Justice Jackson’s 
analysis).  The other crucial separation-of-powers case in foreign affairs law, United States v. Curtiss-Wright 
Export Co., 299 U.S. 304 (1936), focused more on abstract political theory than on statutory frameworks 
governing the conduct of foreign relations.  Justice Sutherland’s elaborately theoretical opinion seemed to 
ground national power in foreign affairs not so much in the Constitution itself but in pre-constitutional notions 
of powers inherent in sovereignty—a “constitution outside the Constitution” indeed.  See generally Sarah H. 
Cleveland, The Plenary Power Background of Curtiss-Wright, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1127 (1999).  More 
importantly, however, the actual result in Curtiss-Wright was to affirm Congress’s power to reallocate foreign 
affairs powers to the President through statutory delegation.  See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 318–23.  That 
result is entirely consistent with Youngstown’s notion that the boundary between legislative and executive 
power is defined through legislation. 
 
23
 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635–37 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 
24
 KOH, supra note 21, at 69. 
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constitutional policies’” such as the separation of governmental powers in 
foreign affairs.25  Framework statutes “constitute” institutions and procedures 
of government in much the same way that the Constitution itself does.26 
The Supreme Court dramatically underlined the importance of such statutes 
in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld27—one of the most vitally important foreign affairs 
cases in a generation.  The critical issues in Hamdan involved interpreting not 
the Constitution itself, but the Uniform Code of Military Justice,28 the post-
September 11, 2001 Authorization to Use Military Force,29 and the Geneva 
Convention on Treatment of Prisoners of War.30  Hamdan vividly illustrates 
the extent to which critical constitutional boundaries, such as the line between 
executive and legislative authority over suspected war criminals, are defined 
by statute and treaty rather than by the text of the canonical Constitution.31 
Thinking of the Constitution in this more capacious sense ought to lead 
constitutional scholars past an exclusive focus on judicially enforceable 
constraints on political action that are grounded in the canonical document.  An 
international agreement like the NAFTA or the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) Agreement, as well as the domestic legislation implementing such 
agreements, performs a constitutional function: It creates institutions with the 
authority to make law and resolve disputes, much like Articles I and III of the 
Constitution do.  These institutional arrangements, in turn, implicate 
constitutional values of separation of powers, federalism, democratic 
accountability, and individual rights.  It makes sense, in other words, to think 
 
 
25
 Id. (quoting Gerhard Casper, The Constitutional Organization of the Government, 26 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 177, 187 (1985)). 
 
26
 See Casper, supra note 25, at 187–93 (discussing the role of framework legislation).  The key 
difference, of course, is that such legislation is not entrenched against change to the same extent as 
constitutional provisions.  See Young, Outside the Constitution, supra note 16, at 426–28, 448–61 (discussing 
the entrenchment issue).  Elizabeth Garrett’s important recent work on framework legislation uses the term in a 
somewhat narrower sense, limited to statutes affecting the processes of deliberation and voting within 
Congress itself.  See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett, Conditions for Framework Legislation, in THE LEAST EXAMINED 
BRANCH: THE ROLE OF LEGISLATURES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 294 (Richard W. Bauman & Tsvi 
Kahana eds. 2006). 
 
27
 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006). 
 
28
 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–946 (2006). 
 
29
 Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). 
 30 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. 
 
31
 See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on 
Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2050–52 (2005) (emphasizing the importance of legislative enactments in 
construing the scope of presidential authority); Young, Outside the Constitution, supra note 16, at 436–42 
(discussing Hamdan). 
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of the design, interpretation, and administration of such agreements as raising 
constitutional issues, whether or not we think that canonical provisions and 
principles, like the Appointments Clause or the delegation doctrine, require or 
forbid international agreements to be structured in particular ways. 
Constitutional lawyers have generally eschewed questions of institutional 
design, except on the rare and heady occasions when one is flown in to consult 
on a new constitution for some exotic island republic in the South Pacific.  As 
I’ve already suggested, that omission stems from our tendency to see 
constitutional law as a set of hard-wired, largely immutable constraints on 
institutions rather than as extending to the structure and content of ordinary 
legislation within those constraints.  But if ordinary legislation—like the 
NAFTA—frequently plays constitutive roles and implicates constitutional 
values, then the design of such institutional arrangements is itself a question on 
which constitutional lawyers may have something useful to say.32  We need not 
focus simply on the constitutional constraints on the structure and operation of 
supranational institutions because the design of such institutions is itself, at 
bottom, a question of constitutional law. 
II. WHAT THE STATUTE SHOULD SAY 
In proposing a framework statute to govern the relationship between 
domestic and supranational courts, it will help to have a specific example in 
mind.  I focus here on investor arbitrations under Chapter 11 of the NAFTA, 
which requires signatory countries to abide by important substantive 
limitations in their treatment of foreign investors.33  Unusually, Chapter 11 
provides a private right of action for investors against signatory states for 
violations of their treaty.34  Such cases are tried to an arbitral panel chosen by 
 
 
32
 See generally Young, Outside the Constitution, supra note 16 (suggesting that constitutional scholars 
should more broadly engage issues of institutional design). 
 
33
 See NAFTA, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993).  Chapter 11 
requires signatory countries to afford “national treatment” to investors from other signatory countries, art. 
1102; to abide by a nonrelative “minimum standard of treatment,” requiring that investors be treated “in 
accordance with international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security,” art. 
1105; and to avoid nationalization or “expropriation” of investments, art. 1110. 
 
34
 See id. art. 1116.  Although Chapter 11’s private right of action remains somewhat unusual, direct 
private access to international dispute resolution seems to be waxing in importance across the domain of 
international law.  See, e.g., Borgen, supra note 1, at 4 (“The dominant form of international dispute resolution 
has shifted from State versus State tribunals to mechanisms that allow non-State actors . . . to claim rights 
under international law and access fora to resolve conflicts concerning those rights.”).  The structural problems 
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the parties.35  The decisions of these panels are binding on the parties, but the 
U.S. implementing legislation specifically provides that panel decisions have 
no direct domestic legal effect absent implementing measures by the U.S. 
political branches.36  Christopher Borgen reports that, “[s]ince 1995, there have 
been about thirty-five NAFTA claims, roughly evenly split with Mexico, the 
United States, and Canada as defendants.”37 
I want to propose, for purposes of discussion, amendments to both the 
underlying agreement and the American implementation legislation.  
Amendments to the agreement would replace the current system of arbitration 
panels with a permanent supranational court, having the following 
characteristics: 
1. Nine members, three appointed by each of the signatory nations. 
2. Judges would be required to have served previously on a national court 
of generalist jurisdiction (i.e., not a specialty court like the Federal 
Circuit or the Court of International Trade). 
3. Judges would serve twelve year terms, subject to good behavior. 
4. The authority of the court would be limited to answering questions 
certified to them by the national courts of the signatory nations. 
5. Hearings in the supranational court would be open to the public.   
6. Majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions would be published. 
7. Opinions of the supranational court would have precedential effect for 
future deliberations by that court. 
 
presented by private rights like Chapter 11 are thus likely to be increasingly salient even outside the NAFTA 
context. 
 
35
 See NAFTA, supra note 33, art. 1120 et seq. 
 
36
 See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 3312(b)(2) (2006) (“No State law, or the application thereof, may be declared 
invalid as to any person or circumstance on the ground that the provision or application is inconsistent with the 
[NAFTA] agreement, except in an action brought by the United States for the purpose of declaring such law or 
application invalid.”).  For a sampling of the debate over Chapter 11, see, for example, Guillermo Aguilar 
Alvarez & William W. Park, The New Face of Investment Arbitration: NAFTA Chapter 11, 28 YALE J. INT’L 
L. 365 (2003); Renée Lettow Lerner, International Pressure to Harmonize: The U.S. Civil Justice System in an 
Era of Global Trade, 2001 BYU L. REV. 229; Adam Liptak, Review of U.S. Rulings by NAFTA Tribunals Stirs 
Worries, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2004, at A20; and PUBLIC CITIZEN, NAFTA CHAPTER 11 INVESTOR-TO-STATE 
CASES: BANKRUPTING DEMOCRACY i–xi (2001), http://www.citizen.org/documents/ACF186.PDF. 
37
 Borgen, supra note 1, at 15.  Professor Borgen also notes that “[a]s of September 2007, the United States has 
not lost any cases under NAFTA Chapter 11.”  Id. at 16 n.72.  But there have been some very close calls.  See, 
e.g., Mondev Int’l Ltd. v. United States (Can. v. U.S.), ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, 42 I.L.M. 85 (NAFTA 
Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2002); Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, 42 I.L.M. 811 
(NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2003); Young, Institutional Settlement, supra note 4, at 1170–77 (describing the 
Mondev and Loewen cases).  
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The proposal would also amend the U.S. implementing legislation giving 
domestic effect to the NAFTA.  The amendments would provide as follows: 
1. Except as superseded by valid federal legislation, provisions of the 
NAFTA would have direct effect in domestic courts.  Private rights of 
action under Chapter 11 would be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction 
of the federal courts. 
2. In any case in which the NAFTA is invoked, and the correct application 
of the NAFTA is not clearly established under existing precedent, the 
domestic court would be required to certify the relevant questions to 
the supranational NAFTA court. 
3. Upon receipt of an answer to the certified questions, the domestic court 
would be required to defer to the NAFTA court’s interpretation, so long 
as the domestic court finds the NAFTA court’s interpretation to be 
reasonable. 
4. In any case in which the NAFTA is invoked by a party, the domestic 
court would be required to furnish notice to the Office of the U.S. 
Trade Representative (USTR), and to afford the USTR an opportunity 
to intervene in the proceedings or participate as amicus curiae if it 
should so desire. 
5. If the interpretation of the NAFTA offered by the USTR should conflict 
with the opinion of the NAFTA court, then the domestic court should 
decide for itself which is the more reasonable interpretation of the 
agreement. 
These proposals are meant to operationalize three positions that I developed 
in a more abstract form in earlier work.  First, the proposals shift from a status 
quo in which the supranational court has exclusive jurisdiction to consider 
questions under an international agreement to a concurrent jurisdiction model 
in which domestic courts play a primary role.38  Second, they make clear that 
the international agreement is “shared law”39 among the various national and 
supranational courts with jurisdiction to construe it; no single court enjoys 
interpretive supremacy over the others.40  Third, they endeavor to address some 
of the institutional weaknesses that currently plague supranational tribunals 
under the NAFTA.41  The remainder of this Essay briefly summarizes my 
reasons for resolving these issues as I have in the proposal. 
 
 
38
 See Young, Institutional Settlement, supra note 4, at 1221–29. 
 
39
 Id. at 1229. 
 
40
 See id. at 1229–36. 
 
41
 See id. at 1243–48. 
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A. Concurrent Jurisdiction 
The current implementing legislation for the NAFTA (and for the WTO) 
takes great pains to “wall off” the domestic legal system from decisions by 
supranational tribunals.42  Those decisions have no direct effect on domestic 
law absent further action by the U.S. political branches.43  This arrangement is 
intended to protect U.S. sovereignty from international actors.  Hence, 
“‘[c]onstitutionalist’ or ‘revisionist’ scholars” of foreign affairs law, for whom 
domestic sovereignty remains a central value, “generally advocate political 
branch rather than judicial control over the domestic implementation of 
international legal obligations.”44  The fear is that if domestic courts are 
allowed to construe international obligations without specific authorization by 
the political branches, those courts will become, in Richard Falk’s terms, 
“agents of the international order.”45 
Many scholars view Professor Falk’s vision as a desirable one, and they 
have accordingly proposed engaging national courts in the enforcement of 
international law in ways that the NAFTA implementing legislation 
forecloses.46  One might also object to such provisions from a more nationalist 
perspective, however.  Even though they are designed to insulate the domestic 
legal system from supranational decisions, “walling off” measures seem 
unlikely to do so effectively.  Once a supranational tribunal has found a U.S. 
policy to violate the NAFTA, the national political branches will face heavy 
pressure to take action to accommodate U.S. law to the requirements of the 
international agreement, as interpreted by the supranational court.47 
If we believe that supranational decisions will, as a practical matter, exert 
an important influence over the domestic legal system, then the NAFTA 
implementing statute has a crucial drawback.  By prohibiting domestic courts 
from construing and applying the agreement, it effectively forecloses those 
 
 
42
 Id. at 1229. 
 
43
 See supra note 36. 
 
44
 Bradley, Judicial Power, supra note 2, at 59–60. 
 
45
 RICHARD A. FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 72 (1964). 
 
46
 See, e.g., ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 66–69 (2004). 
 
47
 See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, The Trouble with Global Constitutionalism, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 527, 534–
36 (2003); see also George A. Bermann, Constitutional Implications of U.S. Participation in Regional 
Integration, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 463, 478 (Supp. 1998) (observing that, notwithstanding similar legislation 
foreclosing direct effect for WTO rulings, “the executive branch has shown its readiness to comply with 
adverse WTO rulings”). 
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courts from influencing the developing interpretation of the agreement.48  That 
leaves the treaty to be construed exclusively by supranational or foreign actors 
who may or may not have perspectives sympathetic to our own.49  Moreover, 
the current legislation forces interpretation to occur in institutions cut off from 
local conditions, rather than in domestic courts sensitive to the day-to-day 
pragmatics of the domestic legal environment.50 
Denying the domestic courts the power to construe and apply international 
law is a departure from the main thrust of past practice.  As Professor 
Monaghan has noted, “American courts have had a long history of enforcing 
international legal norms, but in so doing they have generally determined the 
content of that law for themselves, as well as its domestic consequences.”51  
The Supreme Court recently insisted on the right of domestic courts to “say 
what the [international] law is” in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon,52 which 
addressed whether domestic courts were bound by the International Court of 
Justice’s (ICJ) interpretation of a treaty: 
If treaties are to be given effect as federal law under our legal 
system, determining their meaning as a matter of federal law “is 
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department,” 
headed by the “one supreme Court” established by the 
Constitution . . . .  Nothing in the structure or purpose of the ICJ 
suggests that its interpretations were intended to be conclusive on 
our courts.53 
Under the NAFTA implementing legislation, of course, Congress quite 
deliberately denied domestic courts this power to give the NAFTA “effect as 
federal law” and, in the process, to determine the NAFTA’s meaning. 
There are reasons to believe that the American judiciary may offer a 
valuable perspective on the sort of property rights and free trade protections 
 
 
48
 Cf. Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990) (considering the authority of state courts to apply 
federal law as an important aspect of state sovereignty). 
 49 See, e.g., Movsesian, supra note 2, at 93 (noting that “international courts lack the ties of civic identity, 
history, and legal culture that often make the decisions of domestic courts acceptable to national 
communities”). 
 50 See id. at 94–95. 
 
51
 Monaghan, supra note 6, at 843; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW: FOREIGN RELATIONS 
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 326 cmt. b (1987) (“The [national] courts . . . have the final say as to the 
meaning of an international agreement insofar as it is law of the United States applicable to cases and 
controversies before the courts.”). 
 
52
 126 S. Ct. 2669 (2006). 
 
53
 Id. at 2684; see also Movsesian, supra note 2, at 108–09 (refuting claims in the Sanchez-Llamas 
dissent that past decisions had deferred to the ICJ). 
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embodied in the NAFTA.  In particular, our courts’ institutional experience 
with open-ended principles of freedom of contract54 and burden analysis under 
the dormant Commerce Clause55 could inject an important note of caution in 
the development of judicial review under free trade regimes.  The more basic 
point, however, is a nationalist one: International law seems more likely to 
develop in ways that are not to our liking if our courts do not participate in the 
enterprise. 
To be sure, provisions denying domestic courts the authority to construe 
international law directly do guard against Falkian co-option of the national 
judiciary by guaranteeing a “democratic filter” for international norms.56  The 
alternate risks of nonparticipation and co-option must be weighed against one 
another, but there is no reason to think that the balance will tip in the same 
direction in each discrete area of international cooperation.  One virtue of the 
statutory approach advocated here—as opposed to formulating a general 
principle that domestic courts always or never get to apply international 
norms—is that it can be fine-tuned to maximize domestic judicial participation 
in those areas where the political branches think domestic courts can influence 
the development of international norms in ways that reflect U.S. interests.  In 
those areas where direct application of international norms is likely to 
empower domestic courts to avoid the constraints of national law and politics, 
by contrast, domestic jurisdiction can be constrained more narrowly. 
The proposal confers exclusive federal court jurisdiction to hear private 
rights of action under Chapter 11, reflecting the conventional assumption that 
guaranteeing a federal forum better promotes uniform and respectful treatment 
of foreign litigants.57  I have made no effort to exclude the possibility of state 
 
 
54
 Compare, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down a New York law regulating 
the hours of bakers as an unreasonable legislative interference with freedom of contract), with Williamson v. 
Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (“The day is gone when this Court used the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial 
conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought.”). 
 
55
 Compare, e.g., Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981) (striking down an Iowa 
statute limiting the length of trucks on state highways on the ground that it imposed an excessive burden on 
interstate commerce), with CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 95 (1987) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (“I do not know what qualifies us to make . . . the ultimate (and most ineffable) judgment as to 
whether, given importance-level x, and effectiveness-level y, the worth of the statute is ‘outweighed’ by 
impact-on-commerce z.”). 
 
56
 See Bradley, Judicial Power, supra note 2, at 103. 
 
57
 HART & WECHSLER, supra note 4, at 426 (citing uniformity and concerns about a lack of parity 
between state and federal courts as the most frequent reasons to create exclusive federal jurisdiction).  This 
assumption is reflected in the provision for alienage jurisdiction in Article III, for example.  Whether the 
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court jurisdiction entirely, however.  Such an effort would require special 
removal provisions, for example, whenever a foreign investor raised NAFTA 
obligations as a defense to the enforcement of a state regulation.  As I have 
demonstrated elsewhere, the Framers of Article III were at pains to make a 
federal forum available in most cases involving foreign nationals, but they did 
not make federal jurisdiction exclusive, and they plainly contemplated that the 
state courts would hear important classes of cases implicating foreign affairs 
interests.58   
Indeed, it would be plausible to scrap the proposal’s provision for exclusive 
jurisdiction over NAFTA-created claims in favor of concurrent state and 
federal jurisdiction over all NAFTA matters.59  As Judith Resnik has pointed 
out, state (and local) institutions are increasingly playing a role in the 
formulation and dissemination of international law.60  Simply as a practical 
matter, there are international agreements that will become dead letters in the 
absence of state judicial enforcement.  Full protection of the right of foreign 
nationals accused of crimes to consult their consulate,61 for example, will 
surely require enforcement by state courts hearing prosecutions in the first 
instance.  As the volume of investor disputes under trade agreements grows, 
availability of a state forum might likewise prove a boon to treaty enforcement.  
Moreover, as I have argued elsewhere, a state court role in interpreting federal 
law serves important diffusion-of-power values.62  A significant degree of 
uniformity would remain attainable through the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
appellate jurisdiction.63 
 
assumption is actually warranted under current conditions is, of course, a complex empirical question that I 
cannot hope to address here. 
 
58
 See Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out the Debate over Customary International Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 
365, 426–31 (2002). 
 
59
 See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 4, at 427 (noting that concurrent state and federal jurisdiction, 
subject to a right of removal to federal court, is the most common jurisdictional configuration for federal 
claims). 
 
60
 See Judith Resnik, Law’s Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism’s 
Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564 (2006); Judith Resnik, Foreign as Domestic Affairs: Rethinking 
Horizontal Federalism and Foreign Affairs Preemption in Light of Translocal Internationalism, 57 EMORY 
L.J. 1 (2007). 
 
61
 See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261, art. 36; 
see also Young, Institutional Settlement, supra note 4, at 1164–70 (describing problems arising with respect to 
the enforcement of this treaty). 
 
62
 See Ernest A. Young, Stalking the Yeti: Protective Jurisdiction, Foreign Affairs Removal, and 
Complete Preemption, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1775 (2007). 
 
63
 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2006). 
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B. Dualism and Shared Law 
The proposed NAFTA regime would allow multiple courts, both national 
and supranational, to interpret the agreement without according interpretive 
supremacy to any single tribunal.64  It would encourage the supranational court 
to play a coordinating role by requiring that domestic courts certify doubtful 
questions and defer to the supranational court’s answers.  To an extent, the 
proposed NAFTA court’s role is analogous to that of the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ), which hears “preliminary references” of European law questions 
arising in cases in the national courts.65  The proposal departs from the ECJ 
model, however, by denying the NAFTA court power to bind national courts.66 
By leaving domestic courts the option to disagree with the NAFTA court, 
the proposal follows the “dualist” approach of Chief Justice Roberts’s majority 
opinion in Sanchez-Llamas.67  On the other hand, the proposal would not treat 
the NAFTA court’s interpretation of the treaty as having only persuasive 
authority.  Rather, the supranational decision would have independent 
weight—albeit not conclusive weight—in addition to the persuasive force of its 
reasoning.68  In this sense, the proposal resembles Justice Breyer’s comity-
based dissent in Sanchez-Llamas, which seemed to place independent value on 
respecting the ICJ’s judgment above and beyond the persuasive force of ICJ’s 
arguments.69  Under the proposal, supranational interpretations are 
 
 
64
 To the extent that state courts interpret the NAFTA as described in the preceding section, they would 
be bound by interpretive decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court.  For domestic purposes, after all, NAFTA is 
federal law. 
 
65
 See Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 234 (ex art. 177), Nov. 10, 1997, O.J. (C 340) 
173 (1997); Jeffrey C. Cohen, The European Preliminary Reference and U.S. Supreme Court Review of State 
Court Judgments: A Study in Comparative Judicial Federalism, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 421, 425–26 (1996). 
 
66
 See Cohen, supra note 65, at 421 (noting that “a preliminary ruling by the European Court is a 
supreme rule of decision for the courts of Member States”); GEORGE A. BERMANN, ROGER J. GOEBEL, 
WILLIAM J. DAVEY & ELEANOR M. FOX, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN UNION LAW 354 (2d ed. 
2002). 
 
67
 See 126 S. Ct. at 2684 (denying that ICJ rulings are “conclusive on our courts”); Movsesian, supra 
note 2, at 88–90 (characterizing the majority opinion in Sanchez-Llamas as “dualist” in its approach). 
 
68
 See generally Ernest A. Young, Foreign Law and the Denominator Problem, 119 HARV. L. REV. 148, 
156 (2005) (arguing that a legal practice is “authoritative,” in the jurisprudential sense, if it “carries weight that 
is independent of the underlying reasons for that practice”). 
 
69
 See Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2705 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“In sum, I find strong reasons for 
interpreting the Convention as sometimes prohibiting a state court from applying its ordinarily procedural 
default rule to a Convention violation claim. The fact that the ICJ reached a similar conclusion in LaGrand and 
Avena adds strength to those reasons.”); see also Movsesian, supra note 2, at 101–03 (discussing Justice 
Breyer’s dissent as an example of a “comity” model attributing authoritative weight to supranational 
interpretations). 
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authoritative but defeasible, and the national courts retain the final say as to 
whether the presumption has been overcome. 
The deference prescribed here is  analogous to the deference that domestic 
courts pay to administrative agencies under the Chevron doctrine.70  Indeed, I 
would argue that in applying the statutory “reasonableness” test, domestic 
courts should be less deferential than they are to domestic administrative 
agencies under Chevron.71  This would reflect the fact that the scheme does not 
delegate authority to the supranational court to act “with the force of law,”72 as 
well as the lack of mechanisms of legislative oversight and executive control 
that provide accountability for domestic agencies.  In any event, it is also 
important that domestic courts would retain control over the often vital 
application of the agreement to the facts of individual cases. 
The proposed framework would lack a single court with authority to 
resolve conflicts in the interpretation of the international agreement.  It thus 
follows a “shared law” model, rather than one of interpretive supremacy.73  
Any shared-law arrangement will raise concerns about maintaining the 
uniformity of the underlying regime.  But an interpretive hierarchy subjecting 
the U.S. federal courts to appellate control by a supranational tribunal would 
raise thorny doctrinal problems under Article III;74 more fundamentally, it 
would put a great deal more pressure on the competence and legitimacy of the 
supranational tribunal. 
Probably the best-known example of shared law for American lawyers is 
the general commercial law, or law merchant, which both federal and state 
 
 
70
 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (requiring courts to 
defer to an agency’s constructions of a statute it administers if the statutory provision is ambiguous and the 
agency’s construction is reasonable). 
 
71
 See, e.g., Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (“The weight of [an agency’s] judgment 
in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, 
its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if 
lacking power to control.”); see also Monaghan, supra note 6, at 850 (suggesting that the “respectful 
consideration” accorded by the Sanchez-Llamas court to the ICJ’s ruling was equivalent to Skidmore 
deference).  The problem with Skidmore deference as an alternative, of course, is that it “can mean all things to 
all people.”  Ernest A. Young, Executive Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008). 
 
72
 See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001) (limiting Chevron deference to 
those circumstances in which Congress has delegated to the agency authority to act with “the force of law”); 
Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (same). 
 
73
 See Young, Institutional Settlement, supra note 4, at 1229. 
 
74
 See Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (3 Dall.) 8 (1792) (suggesting that Article III forbids subjecting the 
judgments of federal courts to revision by actors outside the federal judicial branch). 
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courts applied under the regime of Swift v. Tyson.75  Experience under that 
regime suggests that multiple courts can maintain acceptable levels of 
uniformity even in the absence of a single appellate arbiter with authority to 
resolve conflicts, so long as the subject matter is limited in scope and one court 
is able to play a coordinating role.76  The proposal is designed to meet those 
criteria in the context of the NAFTA: the subject matter is limited to 
interpreting the NAFTA itself, and even a watered-down version of Chevron 
deference should be sufficient to enable the supranational tribunal to guide and 
coordinate interpretations by domestic courts.  The uniformity problem 
obviously becomes more difficult if we seek to generalize to contexts 
involving more national players and substantively broader agreements.77 
More fundamentally, any dualist approach leaving national courts with 
authority to reject supranational interpretations is likely to draw charges of 
parochialism.78  This is likely true notwithstanding the proposal’s 
incorporation of presumptive deference to the NAFTA court.  Such concerns 
may recede if I am right that national courts can maintain a generally high 
level of uniformity under a shared-law regime.  But at the end of the day, 
“parochialism” is just a pejorative label for the view that national courts have 
legitimacy advantages over supranational ones as well as superior expertise in 
adapting international law to the domestic legal regime.  I would need to see a 
much more impressive track record for supranational courts than we have to 
date before becoming willing to give those domestic advantages up.  And to 
the extent that such perceptions are widely shared in the domestic community, 
dualism and shared law may be necessary to render the international project 
acceptable.  As Mark Movsesian points out, the dualist insistence on national 
control may “minimize[] the occasion for nationalist backlashes that can only 
lessen the beneficial influence of international courts.”79 
 
 
75
 41 U.S. (15 Pet.) 166 (1842).  For an exploration of the operation of the general law regime, see 
William Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: The Example of 
Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513 (1984). 
 
76
 See Fletcher, supra note 75, at 1515; see also Young, Institutional Settlement, supra note 4, at 1233–
36 (applying Judge Fletcher’s analysis to the problem of supranational courts). 
 
77
 See infra Part III. 
 
78
 See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Implementation and Compliance: Is Dualism Metastasizing?, 91 AM. SOC’Y 
INT’L L. PROC. 504, 517 (1997) (claiming that dualism rests upon “anachronistic . . . isolationism and 
unilateralism”). 
 
79
 Movsesian, supra note 2, at 70. 
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C. Restructuring the Supranational Court 
My proposed replacement for the current system of arbitral panels is 
designed to meet three frequent criticisms.  The first is that trade panels, 
typically composed of experts on the subject of international economic law, are 
biased toward the promotion of free-trade values over other competing values, 
such as environmental protection.80  That criticism resonates with the U.S. 
federal judiciary’s traditional reluctance to create specialist courts.81  The 
proposal seeks to address this problem by requiring that judges appointed to 
the supranational tribunal have at least some judicial experience on a generalist 
court.82 
The second criticism is that NAFTA panel decisions are a ticket for this 
day and train only.  Because they sit to decide only a single case, they are 
undisciplined by the prospect of having to live with the precedential force of 
their rulings in future cases.83  Institutional continuity seems particularly 
important in a period when supranational and domestic courts must work out 
rules and doctrines governing their relations with one another; in such 
circumstances, repeat players are more likely to take a balanced view of the 
competing institutional imperatives and to invest time and other resources in 
the development of workable interjurisdictional rules.84  Hence, the proposal 
would constitute a permanent supranational court whose members serve 
extended terms. 
Finally, supranational institutions are often criticized for being 
insufficiently transparent, both with respect to the selection of their 
 
 
80
 See, e.g., David W. Leebron, The Boundaries of the WTO: Linkages, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 5, 22 (2002) 
(suggesting that WTO personnel will have a “natural inclination” to favor liberal trading rules over competing 
values). 
 
81
 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 147–60 (1985) (opposing 
proposals for specialized federal courts). 
 
82
 Some NAFTA panels under the current regime have, in fact, included generalist judges.  The panel in 
Loewen, for example, included not only Abner Mikva, a respected former judge of the D.C. Circuit, but also 
Sir Anthony Mason, former Chief Justice of the Australian High Court, and Lord Michael Mustill, a former 
British law lord.  See Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, 42 I.L.M. 811 
(NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2003).  Loewen shows that the proposed requirement is unlikely to be a panacea, as 
the panelists’ generalist backgrounds did not prevent them from showing an extraordinary lack of deference to 
the state courts’ rulings in the case.  See id. 
 
83
 See Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Dialogue and Decree: International Review of National Courts, 79 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 2029, 2099 (2004) (criticizing the lack of “‘institutional’ continuity” under NAFTA Chapter 
11). 
 
84
 Id.; Young, Institutional Settlement, supra note 4, at 1245–46. 
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membership and the processes by which they do business.85  As Curtis Bradley 
notes, appointments to supranational courts typically do not have “nearly as 
much transparency or public deliberation as with domestic judicial 
appointments.”86  Moreover, serious concerns exist about national bias by 
supranational judges.87  My proposed statute here would shift front-line 
adjudicative authority to domestic judges who are publicly vetted and subject 
to all sorts of domestic institutional constraints.  The bias issue is more tricky, 
of course: Using domestic courts avoids the problem of foreign judges 
potentially biased against U.S. interests, but obviously creates a risk that 
foreigners will distrust the decisions of national tribunals.  It should at least 
help on this score, however, that the domestic courts in this country have 
considerable guarantees of judicial independence and a long record of 
willingness to buck the interests of domestic political actors.88 
On the process side, proceedings before NAFTA tribunals are not generally 
public, and opinions can be hard to find.  The proposal advanced here would 
open hearings to the public and require publicly available written opinions.  It 
also discourages the phenomenon, common in some international and foreign 
courts, of suppressing concurring and dissenting views.  All of this is meant to 
promote the discipline of written reason-giving and public criticism.89 
 
 
85
 See, e.g., Lerner, supra note 36, at 284–86 (criticizing the current rules limiting access to NAFTA 
proceedings). 
 
86
 Bradley, Judicial Power, supra note 2, at 100 (citing Ruth Mackenzie & Philippe Sands, International 
Courts and Tribunals and the Independence of the International Judge, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 271, 277–78 
(2003)); see also Movsesian, supra note 2, at 92–93 (“Typically, international organizations far removed from 
national communities appoint international judges.  These organizations use selection procedures that are 
opaque or even secretive . . . .”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
87
 See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Miguel F.P. de Figueiredo, Is the International Court of Justice Biased?, 34 
J. LEGAL STUD. 599 (2005). 
 
88
 See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (striking down the Bush Administration’s 
policy of trying suspected terrorists before military commissions). 
 
89
 See, e.g., Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1271, 1374–75 (1995) (emphasizing the discipline imposed on courts by the need to produce 
reasoned written opinions).  The more discursive nature of domestic opinions, in comparison to those of many 
supranational tribunals, is not simply a function of transparency.  Much of it may be attributable to differences 
between the common law tradition of Anglo-American courts and the civil law roots of many supranational 
institutions.  Such gaps are unlikely to be easily bridged.  To the extent that domestic rules of deference accord 
only persuasive weight to supranational rulings, however, supranational tribunals might be encouraged to 
spend more time explaining the rationale underlying their rulings. 
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III.  BEYOND THE NAFTA 
By focusing on NAFTA adjudication here, I have so far avoided the 
difficult question of whether the law governing the relationship between 
domestic and supranational courts should be agreement-specific, with different 
arrangements for different treaty regimes, or general, with one framework 
statute governing all interactions between domestic and supranational 
tribunals.  That is a difficult question, in part because some arrangements will 
work best for agreements like the NAFTA, with a relatively small number of 
parties that enjoy close relations, while others will be more appealing for 
agreements among hundreds of less familiar parties.  In the former case, treaty 
partners may be more familiar with and willing to trust the U.S. domestic 
courts to play a prominent role in dispute resolution, and the U.S. may be 
willing to grant reciprocal concessions to the domestic courts of its partners.  
Both dimensions of trust become considerably more doubtful as we proliferate 
the number of parties to the supranational regime. 
A general statute governing the role of domestic adjudication under 
multiple treaty regimes would likewise have to confront the radical differences 
that exist among supranational adjudicatory institutions.90  The level of 
deference accorded to the supranational court’s interpretations of the 
underlying treaty, for example, might need to vary considerably depending 
upon the institutional characteristics of the particular supranational court at 
issue.91  It makes little sense to accord the U.N. Human Rights Commission, 
for example, the same degree of deference that we might give to the ICJ.  One 
might finesse the problem by instructing domestic courts to employ a flexible, 
Skidmore-type rule that takes into account the institutional characteristics of 
the particular international tribunal.  To do that, however, is to largely sacrifice 
any advantage of uniformity and predictability one might have hoped to gain 
by drafting a general supranational adjudication statute. 
A second, even more vexing question concerns whether the 
interjurisdictional rules under a particular agreement must be the same for all 
parties to the regime, or whether those rules may vary according to the 
different capacities of the various domestic legal systems with which the 
supranational adjudicator must interact.  The Legal Process Tradition has long 
 
 
90
 These differences reflect an even more fundamental divergence in levels of legalization among 
international norms in different areas.  See Borgen, supra note 1, at 9. 
 
91
 See Roger P. Alford, Federal Courts, International Tribunals, and the Continuum of Deference, 43 
VA. J. INT’L L. 675, 792 (2002). 
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suggested that the allocation of decisionmaking authority should be, in large 
part, a function of the institutional capacities of the relevant actors.92  From this 
perspective, radical variations in the institutional capacities of different 
domestic legal systems at least arguably should be reflected in different 
interjurisdictional rules for each system.93  For much of the international law 
community, on the other hand, this sort of variable deference regime smacks of 
pernicious “double standards.”94  A more practical objection would be that, 
given the immense diversity of domestic legal regimes, a set of injurisdictional 
rules that purported to take account of variations in institutional capacity would 
be incoherent. 
It is hard to imagine that the work of constructing a viable set of 
interjurisdictional rules can proceed without some effort to unify the field.  In 
domestic law, we generally do not have multiple abstention doctrines or habeas 
corpus regimes that apply to different state judicial systems.95  And while 
American administrative law does accord different degrees of deference to 
different agencies in some circumstances,96 and the procedures required for 
agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act may vary according to 
the organic statute governing each agency,97 there remains a sense that the field 
functions best when it can be regarded as a coherent regime operating across 
multiple subject matters.  Indeed, one significant impediment to rational 
discussion of the interjurisdictional problem in foreign affairs law today is that 
the different regimes are so numerous and so various that few observers—
much less the people who have to negotiate, draft, and administer the 
agreements—can claim the breadth and depth of knowledge to think 
systematically about the field.98  Under the circumstances, drafting an 
interjurisdictional statute to solve a narrower set of problems may be the best 
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we can do, but that approach itself contributes to the proliferation of diverse 
interjurisdictional regimes. 
CONCLUSION 
The proposal here, of course, is simply meant as a starting point for 
discussion of what the relationship between supranational and domestic 
judicial institutions ought to look like.  The broader point is that such a 
proposal may offer a readier step toward this ultimate question than a focus on 
particular constitutional constraints on supranational delegation.  I do not mean 
to disparage the importance of such constraints or to suggest that such 
constraints should not continue to bind us in our contemporary environment of 
legal globalization.  What I do suggest is that the broad question of 
institutional design is also a constitutional question. 
The usual focus on a fairly narrow set of constitutional objections to 
supranational adjudication—e.g., the nondelegation doctrine and the 
Appointments Clause—may be obscuring the extent to which basic 
constitutional values are pervasively at stake in the design of supranational 
institutions.  These values include federalism, separation of powers, 
democratic accountability, and procedural fairness.  Any number of 
institutional configurations might be constitutionally “permissible” in the sense 
that no domestic court would strike them down, but that hardly means that 
every possible configuration would serve these constitutional values equally 
well.  International law is “constituting” a new set of institutions on top of our 
existing structures, much like the advent of the national administrative state 
grafted a new set of institutions on top of the old Constitution in the last 
century.  It is time for constitutional scholars to stop nibbling round the edges 
of the supranational project and give their full attention to the constitutional 
design issues at its core. 
 
